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E~VIRON~IENTAL LAW
Choosing Which State's Laio Governs
Interstate vVater Pollution
by Robert H. Abrams
International Paper Company
v.
Harmel Ouellette
(Docket No. 85-(233)
ArguedNovember 4, 1986
ISSUES
This case is a sequel to the long-playing saga of
lllinois v. City of Milwaukee in which the United St~tes
Supreme Court twice grappled with questions regar~mg
what body of law governs interstate water pollution.
Here, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled
that victims of interstate water pollution may sue in the
courts of their home state and may seek any and all
remedies afforded by the law of that state in water
pollution nuisance cases. This positio.n is.in dire~t con-
flict with the ruling of the Seventh Circuit when It pre-
viously considered those issues in the denouement of the
City of Milwaukee litigation.
Vital questions of water pollution law are open for
decision-the foremost being whether a downstream
victim state can adjudicate and apply its own state law in
a traditional common law nuisance suit seeking compen-
satory damages, punitive damages and an injunction.
FACTS
Owing to the procedural posture of the case, the
facts for the purposes of review by the United States
Supreme Court are generally not in dispute. The plain-
tiff is a class of 162 landowners and the state of Ver-
mont, all of whom own riparian property on the east
shore of Lake Champlain. International Paper Com-
pany (lPCo) operates a kraft paper mill in New York
state across the lake from these properties.
To comply with its state-issued, federally-approved,
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) discharge permit, IPCo among other things
discharges its liquid wastes through a diffusion pipe that
extends out into Lake Champlain. As a result of the
offshore discharge, prevailing winds and lake currents.
the landowners alleged that the "foul. unhealthy. smelly
Robert H. Abrams isa Professor of Law and Interim Dean at
Wayne State Law School, Detroit, MI48202; telephone (3]))
577-3933.
Issue No.4
and aesthetically unpleasing" contaminants polluted the
waters adjacent to their Vermont properties, interfering
with their use and enjoyment of those properties and
decreasing their market and rental values. Put differ-
ently, the landowners stated a classic water pollution
nuisance case against IPCo. Other claims were raised,
but only issues relating to the nuisance claim are under
review by the Supreme Court at this time.
The nuisance action seeks an array of remedies. The
landowners demand $20 million in compensatory dam-
ages, $100 million in punitive damages and injunctive
relief to abate the continuing nuisance that would re-
quire IPCo to restructure its wastewater treatment sys-
tem.
The procedural posture of the case is a bit complex.
The landowners originally filed suit in 1978 in the Supe-
rior Court for Addison County Vermont, a Vermont
state trial court with jurisdiction over the claim. The
common law nuisance suit wasbrought both individually
and as a class action. International Paper Company, a
New York corporation operating its offending plant in
New York, removed the case to the federal court in
Vermont, exercising its right to do so based on diversity
of citizenship from the Vermont plaintiffs. Once in fed-
eral court, the class was certified and the state of Ver-
mont was added as a class member in respect of its
ownership of riparian land affected by defendant's pol-
lution.
IPCo moved in 1981 for summaryjudgment dismiss-
ing the case. The United States District Court rese:ved
decision until after the remand of the second CIty of
MilwaUkee case had resulted in a holding by the Seventh
Circuit that only the law of the source state could be
applied in interstate water pollution nuisance cases.
Notwithstanding that Seventh Circuit ruling, Chief
Judge Coffrin held that the federal legislative scheme
authorized nuisance suits to be brought in any court and
under the law of any state where the alleged effects of a
discharge occur. Under a special statute permitting ex-
pedited appellate review in advance of trial, the case
went directly to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals to
consider the rectitude ofJudge Coffrin's ruling. Judge
Coffrin was affirmed in a percuriam decision, setting the
stage for IPCo's successful petition for certiorari.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE .
In the seminal City of Milwaukee litigation, the Su-
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preme Court first held, in 1972, that in the absence of
comprehensive federal legislation, federal common law
existed to govern interstate water pollution suits (Mil-
uuukee I, 406 U.S. 91 (1972)). That very year saw the
enactment of the first effective federal water pollution
control legislation and led eventually to a second United
States Supreme Court ruling in 1981 holding that the
1972 federal legislation. as amended, had preempted
federal common law in interstate water pollution suits
(Milwaukee ll, 451 U.S. 304 (1981». The state of Illinois
was free to seek state common law remedies. The United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
in 1984 added restrictions that forced Illinois to seek
common law remedies only in Wisconsin courts applying
Wisconsin common law (J'vIilwaukee ut., 731 F. 2d 403
(7th Cir. 198,1». Certiorari was sought by Illinois and
denied.
As·mentioned above, Ouellette raises the precise issue
for which certiorari was sought and denied in Milwaukee
/II. This is an issue of lingering importance because of
its vast practical significance; the scenario of Ouellette is
likely to be repeated many, many times.
Large numbers of major industrial facilities are lo-
cated adjacent to major water bodies, at least in part, to
take advantage of the waste assimilation capacity of the
receiving body. Lake Champlain and innumerable other
lakes and rivers are either interstate waters or tributary
to interstate waters. As a result, the effects of discharges
of numerous industrial and municipal facilities threaten
adverse consequences beyond the borders of the state in
which the facility is located. At this point, the serious
question of what body of law should govern discharger
conduct and liability arises.
Two themes dominate the discussion. Facility opera·
tors note that this is an era of universal mandatory state
water pollution regulation. All states must prescribe wa-
ter pollution controls that are at least as stringent as
federally-set minimum standards. Facility operators fur-
ther argue that their actions should be subject to regula-
tion only by the state in which they are operating. They
assert that to open them up to suits based on the law of
other states inexorably leads to inefficient dual regula-
tion-they build their plant to meet their home state's
regulatory requirements only to be told by some out-of-
state judge that their plant must be redesigned and that
they must pay whopping compensatory and punitive
damages awards.
Using IPCo as a typical interstate polluter, they claim
to be operating within the bounds of their New York-
granted NPDES permit and that they have invested
significantly in meeting its terms. To be ordered by a
Vermont court to alter their mode of operating creates
precisely the double regulation that a comprehensive
federal regulatory program eschews. Even to allow dam-
ages based on another state's laws exposes them to liabi-
lities that are likewise inconsistent with their need to
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have a single body of law governing their conduct.
The other theme can be set forth with equal clarity.
Injured victims of pollution are not barred from seeking
common law remedies by the federal water pollution
statutes. In fact, the governing federal law has a savings
clause that expressly reserves to citizens their common
law right to sue (33 U.S.C. section 1365(e». The claim
that permit compliance sets the proper standard of con-
duct is unavailing. Compliance with a permit has never
been accepted as a complete defense in common law tort
suits based on nuisance or any other theory. Permits are
consistently viewed as setting a minimum socially ac-
cepted level of permittee conduct.
Since common law suits survive and the permit is no
defense, the only questions are whether the victim state's
courts are an available forum and whether the victim
state's law can apply. Ordinary choice of law principles,
if applicable in this situation, allow downstream victim
states to adjudicate these cases and apply their own law.
Those states have an interest in providing a forum and a
remedy to injured citizens. The facility operators' claims
.of unpredictable dual regulation simply ignore the fact
that they are operating in a federal system having many
sovereigns that are concurrently authorized to enforce
remedial common law systems governing torts.
When the arguments are characterized in this way, it
should be plain that this case is as much about the au-
thority of states in a federal system as it is about reme-
dies for interstate water pollution. This escalates the
importance of the decision handed down. The specific
legal arena may, however, limit the impact of the result.
One avenue available to the Supreme Court in deciding
this case is to look at the specific federal statute lurking
in the background and find that its proper interpreta-
tion compels a particular result. Even then, an authorita-
tive determination could have profound consequences
on future interstate water pollution cases and serve as a
model for resolving all kinds of interstate pollution
cases.
ARGUMENTS
For International Paper Company (Counsel of Record, Roy
L. Raerdon, One Battery Piau, New York, NY 10004; tele-
phone (212) 483·9000)
I. Under the scheme of regulation embodied in federal
water pollution laws, only the source state courts and
law are expected to govern suits arising from the
pollution.
2. Federal law preempts non-source state common law
claims for interstate pollution injuries.
For Harmel Ouellette (Counsel of Record, Peter F. Langrock,
Drawer 351, Middlebury, VT 05753; telephone (802) 388-
6356) The State of Vennont as a member of the class
(Meredith Wright, Pal/ilion Building, MOTltpetier, VT 05602;
telephone (802) 828-3171)
PREVIEW
1. Nothing in the federal statutes or the Supreme
Court's decisions ousts the historic interest in allowing
local suits for injuries sustained.
2. The federal water pollution lawsdo not preempt state
common law remedies for interstate water pollution.
There is no express preemption, there is an express
state law savings clause, the governing federal regula-
tion is not so comprehensive as to impliedly preempt
state law and state law remedies do not conflict with
federal interests served by the federal water pollution
laws.
3. Vermont law applies to the entire controversy and
Vermont courts (either state courts or federal courts)
are a permissible venue for the litigation.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS
In Support a/International Paper Company
Mid-America Legal Foundation argues that:
1. The decision of the Second Circuit in this case was
erroneous in allowing state common law nuisance
suits to be brought in any court and under the law of
any state.
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2. Principles of statutory construction require that the
common law savings provision of the Clean Water Act
be construed to forbid this suit.
In Support ofHarmel Ouellette
The United States argues:
1. Vermont residents may maintain a common law nui-
sance action for Vermont injuries against a New
York-based polluter, using ordinary choice of law
principles.
2. Remedies in such a suit are limited by federal law
which preempts abatement by injunction and the
award of punitive damages.
The State of Tennessee and twelve additional states
contend in a separate brief:
1. The Clean Water Act has not preempted victim-state
state law as it applies to injuries caused by source-state
water pollution discharges.
2. The decision of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Alilwaukee Ill) was
erroneous.
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